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Abstract:
Mining in Africa is at a pivotal moment. For most of the period 2000 to 
2012, the extractive industries were in a ‘supercycle’ of sustained high 
commodity prices. Driven by resource-intensive growth in emerging 
market economies, prices were anticipated to continue for decades to 
come. However, this ‘supercycle’ ended in 2012 and there followed a 
severe slump in mineral prices from 2014 onwards. A new era of 
commodity market dynamics has begun, with changing patterns of 
economic activity, minerals governance, and environmental regulation. 
In this paper we map the terrain of research on the supercycle in Africa 
and identify emerging post-supercycle trends - some of which have 
overtaken research - to establish key questions for scholarship and 
policy. We first note the broad trends in commodities investment and 
production that charact rised the supercycle. Following this we explore 
four themes which emerge from the supercycle, and existing research, 
around: (1) new geographies of investment and extraction, (2) new 
geographies of struggle, (3) national minerals-based development and 
(4) labour and livelihoods. For each of these themes we summarise 
existing research and identify emerging trends and key questions for 
future research in Africa, before concluding. We argue that the end of 
the supercycle has reconfigured the geographies of extraction in ways 
not yet captured in the existing research, particularly around corporate 
strategy, state-business relations and models for mineral-based 
development strategies. On the other hand, the end of the supercycle 
has continued or intensified pre-existing trends towards mechanisation, 
automation, and enclavity while distributive pressures on companies by 





Mining is at a pivotal moment. For much of the previous decade, observers considered the 
extractive industries to be in a ‘supercycle’ driven by rapid resource-intensive growth in 
China and other emerging economies, and a lag in supply growth (Humphreys, 2015; Morris 
et al., 2012). The history of the mining industry is defined by successive cycles of boom and 
bust, due to the combination of cyclical demand for minerals and the time required to create 
new supply capacity. However, a prolonged period of high prices across a range of 
commodities, and the expectation that this trend would continue despite economic cycles due 
to demand from emerging market economies, sustained both high levels of investment in 
extractive industry, and a push into new geographies. Mining companies expanded into new 
frontiers across the globe, investing in low and middle income regions previously deemed 
marginal or risky. This included an increased interested in African mineral reserves among 
multinational investors. Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) using hand-held tools or 
portable mechanized equipment, too, proliferated, particularly for gold - estimated to provide 
direct income to more than 10 million people (Hayes 2008). Optimism abounded amongst 
African policy makers about the prospects for minerals based development (African Union, 
2009). Some economists proclaimed the supercycle offered developing countries a once in a 
generation opportunity to escape poverty, through either improved fiscal management of 
natural resource revenues (e.g. Collier 2015), or industrial policy leveraging mineral licensing 
to compel higher local content and local economy diversification (Morris et al., 2012). 
Driven by changing patterns of economic activity and environmental regulation this 
supercycle has ended and a new, more complex, era of commodity market dynamics has 
begun. The euphoria of prolonged high prices, which quickly rebounded after the 2008 global 
financial crisis, saw companies rush to expand, creating oversupply in multiple commodity 
categories, and high levels of corporate indebtedness. In a severe period of economic distress 
from 2014 onwards, prices plummeted, corporates attempted rapidly to cut costs, and 
revenues dwindled for commodity-dependent governments. Recovery since 2016 has been 
faltering and uneven. Key industrial and energy minerals - notably iron ore, coal and oil - are 
widely anticipated to face stagnant or declining demand over the demand the long-term (e.g. 
see International Energy Agency, 2019; Fitch, 2019). However, there have been surges in 
investor interest - both from private and state actors - in ‘clean energy’ minerals - such as 






























































coltan and lithium. Gold prices have surged as investors seek a familiar counter-cyclical 
hedge in response to increased global economic uncertainty. Notwithstanding these examples, 
the mining industry as a whole is facing difficult circumstances. In this context, multinational 
mining companies have in general become more cautious, focusing on lowering costs and 
risks: shedding tens of thousands of jobs and reducing costs through organisational and 
technological innovation, while repositioning project portfolios away from more ‘complex’ 
operating environments. This has profound consequences for economic development and 
political change in resource-rich African countries. Having borrowed heavily –particularly on 
infrastructure– and expanded public spending during the boom, lower growth rates and tax 
revenues have fiscally strained governments. The IMF (2019), for example, has noted a 
dualistic pattern among African economies, with resource-intensive nations experiencing 
slower growth and increasing signs of fiscal distress relative to non-resource intensive 
economies. Mining labour mig ation, of large-scale and especially artisanal mining has set in 
train demographic change that continues spurring economic diversification and new spatial 
and occupational patterns (Kamete 2012, Mususa 2012). 
Raised popular expectations have been built around the developmental benefits of an industry 
whose future is now uncertain. Policy mechanisms conceived during a boom have been 
implemented during a slump. This is creating political tension at local and national scales 
(Bebbington et al., 2018), and reconfiguring state-business relations. The rise of ‘resource 
nationalism’ takes on new dimensions in this context (Andreasson 2015; Childs 2016). 
Perceptions of the limited benefits deriving from extractive industries and the unsatisfactory 
fiscal contribution of multinational investors are driving new demands for the state to ‘retake 
control’ of mineral resources. However, with declining resource rents, balances of bargaining 
power between cash-strapped African states and multinational firms rationing investment are 
shifting. 
In the context of these changes, this paper considers the implications of the end of the 
supercycle for critical scholarship. The booming extractive sector spurred a concomitant 
research boom. However, geographers have been quicker to examine the consequences of 
commodity ‘booms’ than resource ‘busts’ in the developing world. In both academic and 
policy circles, research has focussed on capturing and using the rewards of a super-cycle than 
on managing the industry’s volatility and busts (exceptions noted below). In this paper we 






























































map the terrain of research on the supercycle in Africa in Geography1 and identify emerging 
post-supercycle trends - some of which have overtaken research - to establish key questions 
for geographers and policy. In Section 2 we note the broad trends and new geographies in 
commodities investment and production that characterised the supercycle. The following 
three sections explore emerging themes from the supercycle and existing research, around: 
new geographies of struggle (Section 3), national minerals-based development (Section 4) 
and labour and livelihoods (Section 5). For each of these sections we summarise existing 
research and identify emerging trends and key questions for future research, before 
concluding.
2. Key dynamics of the supercycle and beyond
From the early 2000s, rising emerging-market demand - particularly China - drove rapid, 
concurrent price increases across key minerals commodities of a kind not seen since the 
1960s (Figure 1). Interrupted by the global financial crisis of 2007/08, it recommenced 
immediately thereafter. This reinforced dominant industry narratives that commodity prices 
were not in an ordinary price cycle, but a ‘super-cycle’ that would continue for decades 
(Humphreys, 2015). These narratives had important effects on the expectations of mining 
investors, corporations and governments.
1 Our citation strategy prioritises a) scholarly geographic thought and b) African scholars critically 
researching the extractive industries that have been historically underrepresented in the literature.






























































Mining is defined by the imperative of continual spatial expansion to secure new reserves, 
but this took on a new character during the boom (Bridge, 2008). Inflated price expectations 
made projects previously deemed uneconomic or excessively risky newly attractive to 
multinationals, while expectations of scarcity compelled strategic outward investment from a 
range of emerging market mining companies, particularly Chinese state-owned companies 
(Carmody, 2011). Mining’s geographic frontiers expanded rapidly, with pronounced effect in 
many African countries. This was exemplified by increased multinational interest in high-risk 
post-conflict jurisdictions such as the DRC, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, as well as large 
increases in FDI to reach unexploited deposits in established mining jurisdictions like 
Zambia, Ghana and Guinea.  There has also been a spatial shift in focus to the deep-ocean as 
a new space of mineral extraction with diamonds and phosphate now mined from the seabed 
within the EEZs of Namibia and South Africa (Carver 2019; Childs 2018). Similarly, the 
search for new, ‘unconventional’ rare earth mineral deposits focuses not just on land (e.g. 
Mkango Resources in Malawi), it also encompasses water where such as the tellurium-rich 
Tropic Seamount, 500km off the coast of northwest Africa (Cornwall 2019). This expansion 
was facilitated by prior decades of pervasive neoliberal reforms designed to improve investor 
shares of resource rents (Campbell, 2013). It was variously characterised as either a 
‘scramble for Africa’ (Carmody, 2011) entrenching Africa’s neo-colonial insertion in the 
global economy (Taylor, 2014; Bush, 2010), or ‘Africa Rising’ (e.g.) prompting optimistic 
reappraisals of the minerals’ role in Africa’s economic development (African Union, 2009; 
Morris et al. 2012) (see Section 4). Scholars and policymakers shared a common assumption 
of continued scarcity of mineral resources and rapid expansion of mining frontiers.
Subsequent events confounded these assumptions. Triggered by slowing Chinese growth and 
excess capacity created by over-investment during the boom, from 2012-2016 mineral prices 
slumped in near unison (Figure 2), (PWC, 2017). As of 2018, most minerals remained well 
below 2007/08 peaks, a notable exception being the battery metals like cobalt (Figure 2).































































Major mining companies were in financial distress. They had (1) excess capacity; (2) highly 
leveraged balance sheets after increasingly financialised companies accumulated debt and 
distributed cash to shareholders and; (3) high operating costs as companies increased volume 
disregarding efficiency, accessed lower-quality ore bodies, deeper underground, in more 
remote and challenging locations (Humphreys, 2019b). Market valuations for major mining 
companies slumped as returns and investor optimism dwindled (Figure 3).






























































Post-2016 trends reflect these cost challenges. Revenues for PWCs top-40 largest listed 
mining companies are just below their 2012 peak, but margins remain considerably lower 
(Figure 4). 
Corporate strategy has shifted from expansion into new frontiers to curbing costs and 
repairing balance sheets. Capital expenditure for PWCs top-40 dropped almost 60% 2012-
2018, alongside near identical decreases in exploration expenditure and debt issuance 
globally (Table 1).
Efforts to improve productivity have generated interest in advancing automation and 
mechanisation (Durrant-Whyte et al., 2015; Deloitte, 2018) with implications for labour. 
Major mining companies already show signs of significant shifts in labour intensity 
(Humphreys, 2019a). Rio Tinto, Anglo American and BHP Billiton have reduced employee 
numbers 35-50% since 2012, even as asset values per employee have increased (Table 2). 






























































Declining profitability and investor conservativism has clear implications for mineral-
dependent African countries. Contrary to common narratives, despite significant growth over 
recent decades Africa remains a relatively marginal presence in global mining, with 
important exceptions in some commodities (Table 3). The continents’ annual share of global 
exploration expenditure over the past decade averages well below 20% of global totals 
(PDAC, 2019). Nonetheless, mining plays an outsize role in many African countries given 
low levels of economic diversification.
Despite the slump, for the 2013-2017 period, 90% of sub-Saharan African countries were 
commodity dependent (commodity exports > 60% total merchandise export value) (Figure 5), 
with 18 classified as mineral-commodity dependent (UNCTAD, 2019). Altered conditions in 
the mining industry have had significant macroeconomic consequences for many African 
countries’ growth prospects. The IMF has observed the emergence of a dualistic pattern, with 
resource intensive African countries averaging 2-3% annual GDP growth since 2013 - 
meaning relatively stagnant per capita growth - compared to above 5% in non-resource 
intensive African countries (IMF, 2019). 






























































This has fiscal consequences. Since the 1980s, African countries have had significantly larger 
resource rents (oil, gas, mineral and forest rents) relative to GDP than Lower Middle Income 
Countries averages, and these rents are additionally important to government revenues given 
thin tax bases. Resource rents grew spectacularly during the 2000s, averaging just under 15% 
of GDP compared to 8% during the 1990s, but have fallen back to 1990s levels. This has 
created severe fiscal strains as many governments increased public expenditure and 
borrowing in anticipation of a sustained supercycle (IMF, 2019).






























































As the following sections discuss, these changing economic dynamics challenge underlying 
assumptions framing scholarship on mining and development over the past decade. Important 
questions emerge. Firstly, how has the changing economic context altered the trajectory of 
mining frontiers across different countries and commodity groups? Leaving aside examples 
such as battery metals, the framing assumption of a ‘scramble’ –inexorable rapid expansion 
of frontiers to secure scarce resources– no longer appears true. Instead, a more complex 
picture is emerging. Major mining companies have adopted more conservative approaches, 
favouring lower-cost, higher-grade deposits in less ‘risky’ jurisdictions. China’s growth is 
slowing and shifting to a less mineral-intensive economic model. What does heightened 
mining company investment caution and withdrawal mean for policy in commodity-
dependent African states such as Zambia, the DRC and Guinea? How will this alter relations 
and bargaining between mining, states, communities and labour? How has the composition of 
mining frontiers changed? Will artisanal miners utilising informal labour and evading 
regulation, or emerging market companies with longer time horizons and fewer reputational 
concerns, be better placed to exploit high-risk deposits (Verbrugge & Geenen, 2018)? 
3. New geographies of struggle 
As mining has expanded in Africa, geographers have documented a concomitant boom in 
struggle from industry entering ‘new’ areas or new forms of mining in previously mined 
areas (e.g. shift from shaft to open pit mining). The ICMM documented an eight-fold rise in 






























































conflict between 2002 and 2013 (ICMM 2015). This struggle occurs on multiple fronts. (1) 
Processes of dispossession which attend mining’s arrival fuel struggle. Extractive operations’ 
need for land and other resources (water) leads it to exclude others from these resources 
leading to livelihoods and resource access loss (Frederiksen and Himley forthcoming). Asset 
(land) transfers across many African countries have driven displacement of populations from 
homes and livelihoods (Abuya 2016, Akiwumi 2011). The industry's reputation for 
resettlement is dire. Livelihoods are rarely replaced alongside homes (e.g. Abuya, 2016). (2) 
Mining’s expansion produces struggles over its environmental impacts, including pollution, 
which can lead to loss of access to (despoiled) land and water resources (Abuya 2016, 
Akabzaa 2009, Akiwumi 2011). (3) Rents generated by industry can trigger national and 
regional struggles. At the national level, rising ‘resource nationalism’ often plays out as a 
struggle over taxation levels (see Section 4). New flows of rents created newly powerful 
political actors (including regions) shifting political settlements spurred struggles over rent 
distribution (Akabzaa 2009, Bebbington et al. 2018, Lungu 2008, Tsuma 2010). (4) At the 
local level, resource flows from companies spur contest. Companies frequently operate 
‘enclave’ models, reducing opportuniti s to spread benefits widely (Ferguson 2006, Negi 
2011). Jobs, contracting and services tenders have all become foci for struggles over mining 
wealth. Communities frequently see themselves as underemployed, challenging extractive 
operations using capital-intensive, low-labour methods (Ofori & Ofori 2018). Companies 
often seek to manage these challenges through CSR programmes. Despite evidence that CSR 
programmes scope and resource have expanded, their development impacts are questioned 
and contested (Andrews 2019, Franks et al. 2014, Frederiksen 2018, Rajak 2011). 
As the super cycle has ended, dynamics are changing. Some conflict associated with 
expansion may reduce; simply because mining companies are less active and not entering 
new areas. As revenues decline, communities’ bargaining power over mining companies is 
reduced and their ‘dependence’ exposed (Verbrugge & Geenen 2018). Other forms of 
struggle may increase, however; for example, strikes around layoffs (see Section 5). Where 
operations continue, expectations of company behaviour have been raised and are not all 
falling - particularly in areas with histories of mining conflict (e.g. Ghana). Declining 
revenues see pressures on community investment budgets used to ameliorate conflict. An 
uneven picture is emerging. Spending is determined in part by local levels of agitation and 
acceptance and community expectations. For some industry observers, this has led to an 
increased focus on instrumentality of CSR (Thomson pers. comm.). Community development 






























































is taking backseat to ‘shared value’, risk management and ‘social performance’ and 
‘measurable results’; while ‘social license’, remains, despite its faults (Frederiksen 2018). 
These trends raise important questions for researchers. Primarily, what are these new 
geographies of struggle? How will levels of conflict over extractive industry change as, for 
example, mining retreats from or shrinks in areas?; Or new (BRICS) actors, often with less 
experience of managing extraction’s impacts, enter to run ‘poorer performing’ mines? There 
are arguments for both increasing and decreasing levels of conflict. What are the long-term 
consequences of automation and retrenchment on political volatility? Further, how can mines 
generate benefits (and therefore legitimacy) for local communities when they are increasingly 
‘enclave’, employing fewer people? How do changing discourses and pressures on CSR 
shape development outcomes? Does resurgent CSR instrumentality affect patronage and 
clientalism in areas of operation?
4. National minerals-based development
The ‘supercycle’ induced significant shifts in thinking about mining’s role in economic 
development in many Africa countries, and the state’s in governing mineral extraction. The 
rise of ‘resource nationalism’ broke a period of consensus around neoliberal models of 
mineral governance. This emphasised favourable conditions for FDI, minimising risks and 
increasing investors’ resource rents (Campbell, 2013). These policies reflected dominant 
thinking in economics which saw mineral wealth’s role in development negatively. The 
‘resource curse’ frames mineral rents as economically distorting (Obi 2016, Siakwah 2017), 
catalysing social conflict and clientelism (Collier et al., 2011) and solved by  ‘good-
governance’ –institutions for minerals which minimise political discretion and state 
intervention. Dissatisfaction over the benefits of these policies, despite the supercycle, led 
many resource-rich governments to consider alternatives (Besada, 2016; Mkandawire, 2014). 
Reviews of mining legislation and contracts with a view to increasing state and/or community 
shares in mineral rents took place in multiple African countries including Tanzania, Ghana, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Liberia, the DRC, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, including higher taxes 
or royalties, indigenous ownership requirements, and domestic value addition or local content 
requirements  (Humphreys, 2019a). Pejoratively termed ‘resource nationalism’ by critics, this 
represented a reframing of mining’s role in national development (Childs, 2016; Andreasson, 
2015). To counter previous enclave tendencies (e.g. Bush, 2010; Ferguson, 2006), new 






























































policies used state intervention to increase domestic economic linkages with large-scale 
mining and boost domestic industrial capacity with requirements for local content upstream 
in the value chain and mineral beneficiation downstream (Morris et al, 2012; Jourdan, 2013). 
Such ideas were influential in African policy circles, the 2009 Africa Mining Vision (AU, 
2009; Busia & Akong, 2017), and saw new legislation, local content policies and mining 
licence renegotiations across the continent (Ayisi, 2015; Ambe-Uva, 2017).
The end of the supercycle undermined policies premised on market dynamics that favour 
national governments controlling scarce mineral resources over mobile investors competing 
for projects. Key research took it for granted that the supercycle would continue for decades 
(e.g. Morris et al, 2012). The post-2012 slump has altered this equation. However, this has 
not led to ‘resource nationalism’s’ retreat, far less a return to investor-friendly models. 
Instead, many African governments are pursuing a harder line against multinational mining 
companies. Notably, in recent years this has included protracted disputes between 
governments and multinational investors over efforts to increase rates of taxation on mining 
in Tanzania, Zambia and the DRC, even as mineral prices have remained low, exploration 
expenditure declined, and investors threatened to withdraw.  This raises questions about how 
changing market dynamics intersect with the political economy of mining. The shift in 
economic policy towards mining was accompanied, in many instances, by changing political 
rhetoric about natural resources’ contribution to development, and a raising of expectations 
around public expenditure, employment and opportunities for domestic business elites (See 
Frynas et al, 2017; Barlow, forthcoming). Alongside altering expectations, this can create 
new interest groups, patronage networks and political claims on the mining industry (Ibid, 
Hansen et al). How will multiplications of distributive claims and popular expectations for 
the mining industry’s contribution to development affect political settlements and state-
business relations during a slump period? Will changing economic conditions continue to 
entrench ‘resource nationalism’ or spur a return to more ‘investor-friendly’ governance 
modalities? Pursuing ‘soft’ local content policies, based on generous voluntary contributions 
from companies, in this context may prove challenging. Will mining companies previously 
willing to engage local content and beneficiation initiatives continue to do so or will cost-
cutting and productivity imperatives spur capital-intensive, ‘enclave’ operating models? 
Historical experience shows that building industrial capabilities requires a long-term process 
of learning-by-doing (Khan, 2013). Can nascent domestic industries around mining survive 
continued instability and uncertainty? Smaller, domestic firms typically struggle to compete 






























































with multinational firms on cost and quality and are more vulnerable to shocks. What forms 
of counter-cyclical industrial policy support might help protect progress made?
5. Labour and livelihoods
The supercycle expanded both formal and informal mining industries in many African 
countries with important consequences for labour and livelihoods. Struggles between mining 
companies and labour have expanded with industry growth and increased profits, with 
companies organising their corporate and operational structure to minimise (organised) 
labour’s power, most notably through the use of subcontracting (Fraser and Lungu 2007, 
Negi, 2011, Verbrugge & Geenen 2018). In areas where deposits allow, rising prices have 
also made artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) lucrative livelihood options, leading to 
booms in areas previously ignored (e.g. eastern DRC, see Verbrugge & Geenen 2018). 
Augmented local and national state resources have enabled expanded welfare programmes 
and state employment (Bebbington et al. 2018). However, while providing employment, the 
impact of mining booms on livelihoods is complex: In rural frontiers, this often disrupts 
existing agrarian livelihoods resources, in particular by competing for land and water, 
negative environmental externalities, and changing rural labour force composition (discussed 
in Section 3). In areas with ASM, this generated contestation between formal and informal 
mining over resource access, given the boom-time corporate priority of securing reserves for 
future growth (E.g. DRC, Tanzania, Ghana, see Hilson & Potter 2005, Verbrugge & Geenen 
2018). The social impacts of mining are frequently contested. Changed land use can spur 
increased land prices and speculation. Areas witnessing both artisanal and formal booms saw 
influxes of migrant labour, for both employment in mining and the attendant service-sector 
around operations (Akiwumi 2011, Bryceson & Geenen 2016, Nyame et. al. 2009). This can 
strain existing natural resource-based livelihoods, infrastructure/social services, and create 
social tension. as communities link migration to crime and prostitution (Akiwumi 2011). 
More widely, increased competition for qualified mining talent has driven wage inflation in 
skilled job categories exacerbating already stark expat/local wage disparities sparking 
controversy. 
Post-supercycle, this picture is changing. As focus shifts to cost control over expansion, 
emphasis increases on technological innovation and digital technologies to enable automation 
and mechanisation and to more efficiently manage resources and reduce costs (Durrant-






























































Whyte, 2015). With labour a key cost, labour intensive extraction techniques are under 
pressure, creating labour struggles. Redundancies and layoffs (or prospects thereof) from 
formal mining sector have political and economic ripple effects. For example, unemployment 
and constraints on government spending increases pressure on mines as a source of 
livelihoods and generator of employment (Hilson & Potter 2005). However, as the formal 
sector stalls on deposits that are no longer economic, more artisanal producers can occupy 
space left by the formal sector, absorbing its labour too (Verbrugge & Geenen 2018). The 
outlook for communities which grew up around now closed mining operations can be bleak. 
Historically, many communities have taken decades to recover. For example, South African 
ex-gold and coal mining towns suffer widespread unemployment and deprivation (Binns & 
Nel 2003, Siyongwana & Shabalala 2018). By contrast, company lay-offs can spur surges in 
artisanal mining as the unemployed miners resort to artisanal mining at sites already familiar 
to them (Yankson and Gough 2019). Particularly gold diggers have proliferated in mineral-
rich mining sites, acting inadvertently as prospectors for large-scale mining interests. 
Artisanal miners, who benefitted from the gold price rise of the supercycle are likely to move 
to nearby towns, where they can invest their savings in diversified businesses and improved 
housing, thereby contributing to urbanization, also readily at hand should investment return 
(Bryceson & MacKinnon 2012, Jonsson & Bryceson 2017).
All this raises questions for future research. Automation and mechanisation leads to a smaller 
labour force, with higher skill requirements. Technology has often been used as a means to 
control labour, what now? How will these trends interact ith expectations for employment 
creation? If the retreat of the formal sector sees a concomitant growth in the artisanal sector, 
how best to manage the social and environmental impacts of ASM? How do mining and other 
livelihoods (particularly, agrarian) interact in changing rural spaces? What do these changing 
livelihood opportunities mean for patterns of migration in extractive zones? How to best 
manage impacts of mine closure on local communities? Can deindustrialisation lead to 
economic innovation and alternative paths to development (Binns & Nel 2003)? The presence 
of erstwhile mining activity lingers, leaving political traces and shaping material and 
emotional geographies with it. For example, how are former mine sites remembered and what 
‘ghosts’ might they leave behind (Edensor 2005)? What affectual and physical legacies are 
left behind in the material waste flows created by the mining process and what are their 
enduring implications for thinking about social justice (Pini et al 2010)?































































In this paper we have explored recent research on the mining sector in Africa and reflected on 
this considering recent changes of the supercycle’s end. The paper opened by exploring the 
changing geographies of investment and sectoral shifts in mining before examining the 
changes brought by the supercycle, its end, and what questions emerge for future research in 
three key areas of: struggle, national development strategies and labour and livelihoods. The 
last half decade has seen a fundamental shift in the possibilities of extraction-led 
development and the reconfiguring of governance of the extractive sector. New trends have 
emerged around corporate strategy and actors, with the increasing presence of BRICS-based 
companies with implications for state-business relations and models for mineral-based 
development strategies. Equally, the end of the supercycle has continued or intensified pre-
existing trends towards mechanisation, automation, and enclavity while distributive pressures 
on companies by local communities and host nations increase. While, at the global level at 
least, it remains that Africa is not that important to mining, but mining is important to Africa; 
As scholars we need to more effectively grapple with the changes afoot in Africa since the 
end of the supercycle. The research directions suggested here offer initial directions to chart 
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